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
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## MILITARY STRATEGY IN TRANSITION

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### MILITARY ISSUES RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**MILITARY STRATEGY IN TRANSITION**

**by**

**William O. Staudenmaier**

**20 November 1978**

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
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## FOREWORD

This memorandum examines the changes in military strategy brought about by the awesome destructiveness associated with nuclear weapons. The author asserts that nuclear weapons, together with the sophistication and proliferation of modern conventional weapons, has called into question the use of military force in international relations. He contends that warfare has become so risky, particularly for the superpowers, that strategy in the last 30 years has been characterized by avoidance of direct conflict between the United States and USSR, battlefield stabilization and negotiations before the stakes and consequent risks became too high. He concludes that the confluence of the trends of fragmented nationalism in the Third World, and the increasing dependence of the industrialized world on the resources found in the weak, vulnerable states of the Southern Hemisphere, should operate to shift the battlefields of the superpowers to areas in which their vital interests are not at stake.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.  
Major General, USA  
Commandant

#### **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR**

**COLONEL WILLIAM O. STAUDENMAIER** has been assigned to the Strategic Studies Institute since his graduation from the US Army War College in 1976. Previously, he served as a divisional air defense battalion commander in Germany and in various staff assignments at the Department of the Army. Colonel Staudenmaier graduated from the University of Chattanooga and earned a master's degree in public administration from Pennsylvania State University. He has published articles on air defense and military strategy in Vietnam.

## **MILITARY STRATEGY IN TRANSITION**

Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, warfare was limited and the small, professional European armies were so expensive to maintain that battles were seldom pushed to the extreme of the destruction of those armies. Napoleon, however, changed all of that. Ideology and the Industrial Revolution armed the French army with spiritual fervor, elan—and lethal firepower seldom matched in military history. The object of strategy became the defeat of the enemy army by maneuvering firepower to the decisive point, massing it, thereby destroying the enemy. The total resources of the nation were mobilized and the state was supreme because of its virtual monopoly of the instruments of war.

The nature of warfare did not significantly change for over 150 years; World War I and World War II were fought using Napoleonic strategic concepts. The advent of nuclear weapons, however, created the conditions needed for change and the strategic era that began with Napoleon ended in the nuclear fireballs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The terrible destructiveness associated with nuclear weapons forced a reevaluation of the strategic concepts underlying Napoleonic warfare. Clausewitz had articulated the notion of absolute warfare and modern science made it a reality. Since 1945, warfare has been in a period of transition. The existence of nuclear weapons and the increasing



lethality and proliferation of modern sophisticated conventional weapons has led to a redefinition of winning in warfare.

Nuclear arsenals made the risks of waging war in the traditional manner so high and the probability of winning such a war so low, that the very concept of "winning" has been questioned as it relates to conflicts between the superpowers or their client states.<sup>1</sup> During the past quarter century, the superpowers for the most part have avoided direct and active military confrontation with each other. The supersophistication of modern weapons, together with their proliferation, has made mid-intensity warfare with even the lesser developed states a risky proposition. The result has been that the utility of the actual use of force in high- or mid-intensity war is viewed as being minimal for nation-states. However, as Mao, Giap, Guevera, and Marighella have demonstrated, the utility of military force at the lower end of the conflict spectrum is maximized for guerrilla movements and terrorists. The idea that, except for deterrence, the utility of force is limited for a nation-state and high for a subnational or illegal irregular force has significance for the future.

Two other trends reinforce this notion. The 20th century is the age of nationalism. The number of nation-states has almost quadrupled since 1900, and the current international scene has been characterized by the phoenix-like rise of scores of new states from the ashes of former European colonial empires. Unfortunately many of these new states are authoritarian in nature, allowing few opportunities for the peaceful change of government through a democratic electoral process.<sup>2</sup> Opposition groups are driven underground where political discontent festers, only to break out anew in revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

Significantly, these guerrilla battlefields are in the underdeveloped, former colonial areas, from which the industrialized nations import their raw materials. The West has come to recognize the vital importance of these raw materials and energy sources to the health of Western economies and to their very viability as nations. Force does have both political and military utility for the guerrilla fighting in the strategic resource-laden Third World. The confluence of these trends in the waning years of the 20th century has great import for military strategists.

Another trend is developing that must be closely watched by US military planners. The location of many of these battlefields of the future in the Southern Hemisphere and the existence there of

indigenous discontent or of guerrilla forces that can be exploited by major powers have added a new dimension to the midrange strategic environment. Major powers which support these revolutionary forces may gain influence and, perhaps, even control of important geostrategic areas or lines of communication, if the supported movements are successful. This is a low-risk strategy for the USSR which has been made lower still by the use of proxies or client states in areas of the world in which the danger of direct superpower military confrontation would otherwise be great. The pursuit by the USSR of this proxy strategy puts the United States, which places a high premium on the moral element in international relations, at a serious disadvantage. If the Soviets and other nations perceive that the United States lacks the will to challenge this type of aggression when it is in the interest of the United States to do so, it could dramatically increase the frequency with which this type of strategy might be pursued.<sup>3</sup>

It is important for the United States to maintain the strategic force structure required to preclude nuclear warfare and to deter even the low possibility of having to fight mid- and high-intensity warfare. The strategy, doctrine, and force structure suitable to wage war in either Europe or Asia, however, should not be maintained to the exclusion of a capability to meet the much more likely challenges posed by client or proxy wars in the resource-rich nations of the Third World. Nor should the United States posture itself *solely* for these latter contingencies; a balance must be struck between the US security needs in Europe and the US military requirements in the Third World.

Having now considered some of the trends of the evolving strategic environment, it may legitimately be asked: "How will these trends affect US strategy in the 21st century?" This is not an easy question to answer. The effort to shed light on the future dimensions of US military strategy will first require a consideration of the nature of military strategy itself and some of the factors that serve to constrain it.

### THE NATURE OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Military strategy consists of both a strategic objective and a strategic concept or course of action designed to achieve that objective. The nature of the objective and the means to attain it will vary with the echelon at which the strategy is conceived. At least three distinct, although interrelated, levels of military strategy may be identified—comprehensive, coordinative, and operational.<sup>4</sup>

Comprehensive military strategy is general in nature with a long-range orientation. It interfaces most directly with the other elements of national power in the planning and implementation of an integrated, global national strategy. Since comprehensive strategy is the military input in the development of a national strategy, it must be orchestrated with the other elements of national power. Coordinative strategy is focused on midrange military problems such as the relationship of Northeast Asia to NATO in terms of global military strategy, the importance of the short war-long war concept in Europe, and the structure of the forces needed in a non-NATO contingency. Generally, DoD and the Military Departments are intimately concerned with this coordinative strategy because of its force structure implications. Operational strategy has the shortest time-horizon of the three typologies. Strategic constraints will have their greatest impact at this level of strategic planning, simply because its short-term orientation will not allow sufficient time to resolve all of the deficiencies in either capabilities or doctrine. Operational strategies deal with such things as the general defense concept for NATO's Central Region, the coordination of Allied combined forces, and the required overall force readiness, as opposed to unit readiness, of the deployed military forces.

In the past, these subelements of US military strategy were not explicitly recognized, to the detriment of clear strategic thought.<sup>5</sup> US strategic concepts, particularly as they relate to conventional warfare, are the result of the historical study of warfare; however, war tends to obscure the levels of strategy and, as a result, students of strategy were disposed to focus at the operational level. The insights gained from such a focus were not completely relevant to the post-World War II peacetime strategic problems of the United States, which generally were posed at the coordinative and comprehensive levels. Nor will they be totally relevant to the strategic needs of the next 25 years.

Once a strategist recognizes that his problem is one of varying levels of analysis, he should theoretically be free to innovate. Unfortunately, the nature of military strategy is much more complicated than that. The next generation of military strategists, as the last, will face many constraints, which will limit their feasible strategic choices.

#### STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS

For the greater part of this nation's existence, the two great oceans made the United States virtually unassailable, thereby providing the

time needed to mobilize unhindered in two world wars. The merging of the nuclear weapon with the missile ended all that. America has been vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack for some time, so it has been unable to pursue political policies or military strategies that ignore its own survivability. This situation has caused US strategists to avoid a military confrontation with the USSR and gradually led to the mutual recognition of spheres of influence. It is of little solace, but of immense strategic importance, that the USSR is also vulnerable to a US nuclear strike. It is not merely the fact that the United States is vulnerable that constrains US strategists, it is the degree of vulnerability that really matters—the very survival of the nation is at stake. So the two superpowers have attained a “balance of terror” that promotes the status quo where their vital interests are concerned and allows strategic flexibility only in peripheral areas. The challenge to superpower strategists is to pursue their national interests without precipitating a nuclear confrontation. Although the strategic constraints induced by the vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack are perhaps the most important, they are by no means the only constraints.

The United States, like other nations, has evolved “a way of war” that has deep historical, cultural, and psychological roots, which is to say that it will be difficult to change.<sup>6</sup> Until recently, Americans have been accustomed to wars that were total, violent, and victorious. We are a pragmatic people who attack distasteful jobs directly, who want to finish them quickly, and who then want to get on to other more pleasant pursuits. Because Americans also want to be morally right, our wars have had an ideological, almost messianic quality about them. Americans also believe in fair play—we say we won’t hit first. All of this constrains strategy in at least two ways. First, any strategist who contemplates fighting a protracted, limited war starts with two strikes against him. Secondly, and most importantly, Americans will not support a war in which the United States is clearly the aggressor, so US strategists cannot contemplate preemptive war. General Eisenhower expressed it this way, “...[considering] surprise attack with nuclear-armed missiles [is not] compatible with a democracy.” Morality aside, this could put the United States at a critical disadvantage, because in strategic nuclear war the first use can be decisive—at least that is what the Soviets believe.<sup>7</sup>

National will is a dynamic element of national power and it is composed of at least three subelements: Public will, Congressional will, and Presidential or executive will. Crucial to the expression and even

more significantly to the formation of national will is the mass communication media. The impact of the Vietnam experience on national will was clearly evident during the Angolan affair. Intervention in Angola was portrayed by the media and by many congressmen as "being another Vietnam," when in truth the two situations were literally and figuratively a world apart. This perception of a loss of US will could very well set the stage for costly errors in foreign policy in the future, both by American statesmen and by foreign diplomats. World opinion will also constrain American strategies in the more interdependent and, in some ways, more turbulent world that is evolving. In a democracy, a firm, articulated, and consensual public opinion can be decisive. Strategists must learn to recognize it and attune to it or their strategies will fail. Certainly, there were options that were unavailable to decisionmakers during the Angolan affair simply because of public attitudes toward intervention that existed at that time.

There are also political/legal constraints on strategy. The most controversial legal constraint on strategy is the War Powers Act, which many national security analysts consider to be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it is a significant constraint on contingency planning. The Nunn Amendment, the withholding of funds from Vietnam and the War Powers Act are all recent examples of ways that Congress can constrain strategy.

Geography has a more direct effect on strategy. The oceans that separate the United States from the Eurasian landmass are still effective barriers to conventional invasion, if not to nuclear attack. The United States, by virtue of its urban character, is more vulnerable to a countervalue nuclear attack, particularly in its crowded northeast sector, than other less developed countries. The lack of defensive depth in West Germany causes the United States and NATO to adopt a political strategy of forward defense that might not otherwise be the best military strategy. In this NATO context, the friendly ocean now becomes an extremely fragile line of communication of great concern to US strategists.

While strategies can be changed with a stroke of the pen, it takes considerably longer to develop the forces, equipment, doctrine, and training needed to implement them. This indicates that any single change in strategy in the mid-term, because of force structure alone, will be marginal or incremental in nature. The mistake of the 1960's which attributed a strategy—the 2-1/2 War Flexible Response

Strategy—with a capability that it never achieved, should not be repeated.

The quantitative and qualitative nature of the threat also constrains the strategist. If the enemy is superior in manpower, it will require the strategist to seek allies—and the introduction of allies always leads to strategic constraint because allies generally are asymmetrical in power or in interests both within, but especially outside of the alliance area. Israel in 1973 and the 1956 Anglo/French invasion of Egypt are cases in point. The military capability of the enemy also impacts on strategy. If the enemy is weak, perhaps a direct approach is the answer, but if he possesses the power of the USSR, then a more indirect approach is indicated that capitalizes on US strengths and exploits Soviet vulnerabilities.

In considering more creative approaches to strategy, planners are constrained by bureaucratic inertia. The bureaucracy is based on routine and because of this it resists innovation. Therefore, strategic concepts are usually compromise positions to which all parties can agree—it is no wonder then that generals are so often accused of preparing to fight the last war. Michael Howard has commented on this phenomenon:

NATO strategy and the NATO force structure has taken so much labor to construct—it is the result of such agonizing disagreements, such precarious compromises—that no senior NATO official cares even to contemplate proposals for its alteration. Even to suggest them is to be branded as irresponsible.<sup>8</sup>

Imperfect knowledge also constrains strategy. Strategists must act on the observable capabilities of the enemy because they cannot reliably discern his intentions. Technological improvements in the ability to observe the enemy's capabilities continue to be made, but are not marked by similar strides in discerning enemy intentions.

The economic resources that a nation is willing to devote to defense is a major factor in the formulation of comprehensive and coordinative strategies. Economists correctly tell the strategist that he is competing for scarce resources and even in an affluent country like the United States there is never enough to go around. "How much can I afford?" is the politician's question and "How much do I need to do the job?" is the strategist's question. This difference of perspective is at the root of most national security debates. Ideally, strategy would derive from interests, and resources would be allocated to implement

the strategy. Realistically, however, the budget drives strategy and the shortfall is termed risk to balance the books. Therefore, the strategist must be pragmatic, and he cannot propose strategies that are financially unobtainable—i.e., the 2-1/2 War Strategy of the 1960's.

Finally the most significant conventional strategic constraint, at least to the US Army, is the current lack of draft legislation. Essentially, the zero draft has dismantled the Selective Service System and has had a near-fatal effect on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). It leaves the United States without a timely personnel mobilization capability. The Selective Service machinery would take months to resume effective operations and the IRR, especially in the combat arms in the Army and in the maintenance specialties in the other Services, will virtually cease to exist within the next 10 years. When this personnel mobilization problem is linked to a "cold" production base, the result is that today the United States has a paper strategy where a "long war" is concerned. This mobilization problem with its adverse impact on deterrence is a constraint today and will become ever more critical with each day that it goes unresolved.

Given the postulated evolving nature of the strategic environment and of strategy, it becomes necessary to determine what must be done *now* to cope with these dynamic factors. Obviously the current US military strategy is the base from which changes in strategy must be made. The current US strategy is to maintain two concentrations of forward deployed military forces—in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia. It is a 1-1/2 war strategy that envisions the conventional capability to deal simultaneously with one major—Western Europe—and one minor contingency. The Middle East, Persian Gulf and Korea are the primary, although not the only, minor contingency areas of concern. The sea and air lanes of communication must also remain open, particularly to Western Europe, Japan, and to those countries which supply the United States with critical resources. Because of the magnitude of the potential threat and the scarce resources, particularly manpower, that are available to the United States, it is necessary to depend on allies, on Reserve Components and on a declining mobilization capability.

#### STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The strategic environment of the next 25 years will be a very different one from that which existed a generation ago. The world has

fragmented into over 160 sovereign nations and some political analysts predict that the total could eventually reach 300 by the turn of the century. Although the anticolonial revolutionary struggles seem to have peaked, the West is now faced with the relatively more aggressive economic and political policies of the resource-rich Third World. Advances in weapon technology, both nuclear and conventional, may make this a potentially more dangerous world in the year 2000. The USSR has steadily increased its military strength to the extent that today it can claim strategic parity with the United States—and Russia shows few signs of slowing its military buildup in the future. All of these trends, and others, are straining the strategic concepts that evolved in a less ambiguous strategic era.

During World War II, when the current US strategic concepts were established, the military objectives were clear: to defeat the enemy armed forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan and to force their governments to surrender unconditionally. Since World War II, however, there has been a broadening of the strategic mission. The focus of strategic problems has moved from the operational level to the more ambiguous and complex coordinative and comprehensive levels. Strategists today, and increasingly in the future, will concern themselves not only with plans for general war, but also with lesser contingencies that may occur simultaneously with a general war or, more likely, quite apart from one. They must be prepared to plan throughout the entire spectrum of warfare. And, perhaps most importantly, US strategists will continue in the foreseeable future to be defenders of the status quo, whereas their strategic military objective during World War II was to overturn the rupture of the status quo that had been achieved by the Axis Powers. The former is a defensive mission while the latter required offensive operations. The point is that the strategy, doctrine and force structure that responds to today's perceived strategic environment is perhaps already irrelevant and almost certainly will not be responsive to the strategic environment postulated for the 21st century.

The strategy that will be relevant to the strategic environment of the next century will be composed of the following three elements:

- Conflict Avoidance
- Battle Stabilization
- Negotiation

Regardless of what our current military strategy is purported to be, in actual practice it has tended to adhere to the pattern above.



The Korean Conflict of the 1950's, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam misadventure of the 1960's, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War all reflect this pattern. Warfare became limited, the battlefield contained and stabilized through the use or the threat of the use of massed firepower; then a settlement was negotiated before the stakes and the consequent risks became too high. The limitation of political goals is the result of the perception that the outcome of war is so uncertain and the risks so high that it is an unprofitable venture for nation-states at the mid- and high-intensity level.

It is clear that probably since World War II and undoubtedly since the USSR obtained nuclear weapons, the United States has sought to avoid open conflict with the Soviet Union—and she with us. This tacit understanding has served both countries well and should remain the basis for strategy for the next quarter century, for the prospect of open warfare between the superpowers carries with it the unwanted risk of escalation to nuclear warfare. Conflict avoidance has led to the widespread, but erroneous, perception that the utility of force in international affairs is near zero. One need only ponder the recent experience of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam to recognize that at least a *certain* type of force does have utility—even against superpowers. Yet, it is probably true that actual use of force at the high- and mid-intensity end of the conflict spectrum has become less useful, particularly between powers that possess nuclear weapons. This is not necessarily the case for lesser, but still major conventional military powers. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War is an example of the use of force in a mid-intensity war which had utility. Paradoxically, it had utility both for Egypt and Israel.

A key observation from that war that has portent for the future is that the battlefield was first stabilized and then negotiations to end the war followed, although the armies were still intact—albeit the Arab armies were badly mauled. Lest this be considered an aberration, recall that from the US perspective both the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam War ended in precisely the same way. Any future war in either Western Europe or Korea could end in a similar way, provided that neither side allows the other to gain an overwhelming preponderance of combat power. After stabilization, negotiation of limited political objectives would quickly follow to prevent the war from escalating to nuclear warfare.

This does not mean that the war would necessarily end quickly—warfare is too unpredictable for one to have a high degree of

confidence in such assertions. In Korea more than two years passed before a cease-fire was effected and in Vietnam it was eight years after the first US combat units were introduced before the cease-fire was established. But the US-USSR were not in direct conflict in these two wars, as they would be in NATO. Furthermore, the configuration of the operational theater in western Europe does not allow the Allies to trade much space for time; there would not be much to negotiate if the Allies were backed against the Rhine or the North Sea. Nevertheless, if the USSR were deprived of a quick victory and the battlefield stabilized in West Germany, then the danger of escalation to strategic nuclear warfare would dominate the councils of the two chief protagonists, tending to drive them to the negotiating table. If the direct confrontation of the superpowers occurred outside of western Europe, then the drive to negotiate might be somewhat weakened because initially, at least, the vital interests of the superpowers might not be involved and the time required to begin negotiation could stretch out. But the spectre of nuclear weapons would also govern strategy in these areas as well.

This is nothing more than a recognition that the technological improvements to nuclear weapons, their delivery means, and the proliferation of supersophisticated conventional weapons of unprecedented lethality will continue to preclude premeditated direct conventional war between the superpowers in areas that they consider vital. The risk of escalation to nuclear holocaust is too great. The confluence of the other two trends of fragmented nationalism in the Third World and the increasing dependence of the industrialized world on the resources found in the weak, vulnerable states of the Southern Hemisphere, should operate to shift the battlefields of the superpowers to areas in which their vital interests are not at stake. This could mean that the most probable areas of conflict between the superpowers in the next quarter century will be in the peripheral areas of the Third World. The Soviet/Cuban military activity in Africa may be an indication that this battle has already been joined.

In a sense, the United States should welcome a shift away from the European landmass where it must face the USSR at the point of the Soviet's main strength to areas in which the United States can bring its maritime power to bear. To confront the USSR in the peripheral areas, however, presents some problems in view of the strategic constraints discussed earlier. First, there is the problem of the American way of war to consider. The Russians have shown great imagination in

developing a "proxy" strategy to promote their interests in the Third World. The type of conflict that is most likely in the Third World—limited, protracted, guerrilla warfare—is anathema to most Americans. The manpower constraint that has caused the United States to enter into alliances to protect its vital interests in Europe and Asia has tied down US troops in static positions. Political realities for the most part preclude the use of these alliance or theater specific forces in contingency areas. Moreover, virtually the entire US military force structure, active and Reserve, is being configured for the NATO mission. There will be relatively few other US ground forces available for major contingency missions—there is even talk of mechanizing the Marines. That means that the Reserve Components must be mobilized if the United States is to embark on any major contingency operation, particularly if it must be sustained for any lengthy period of time. The mobilization experience of Vietnam (rather the lack of it) in this respect would not lead one to be very optimistic.

Other constraints also inhibit US action in contingency operations. The War Powers Act could tie the hands of the President, particularly if the President and Congress were at odds. Because it is untested, it would add another element of uncertainty into a subject already fraught with uncertainty. Although the national will cannot be predicted with any certainty in advance of an event, the Vietnam experience will weigh heavily on the scales against protracted counterinsurgent interventions in the Third World. It must be remembered that the military bureaucracy, once Vietnam was over, hastily turned its attention to a European land war a la World War II.

Finally, there is a very real, though hidden danger in superpower interventions in the Third World. Paradoxically, while the utility of force is high in the proxy wars being waged by the USSR and its clients in Africa, the risk of uncontrolled escalation is also high. The status quo that has evolved since World War II in central Europe is a result of the perceived mutual interest of the United States and the USSR to preserve the peace. Armed with nuclear arsenals that could mortally wound one another and with conventional, deployed forces inadequate to guarantee either side a quick victory, the superpowers could not conceive of any possible political utility that could accrue to the actual use of military force in Europe. Deterrence worked particularly well in the European context because of the asymmetry of power projection capability between the superpowers outside of the Eurasian continent. Until Admiral Gorshkov expanded the Russian fleet to its present

dimensions, the United States was literally unchallenged in the Third World, particularly in Africa and South America. The problem today is that the Soviets now have the power projection capability to at least challenge the United States in these troubled peripheral regions. While the Kremlin has thus far refrained from using large numbers of Soviet military forces in the Third World, it is a self-imposed constraint, reflecting perhaps the success of the proxy strategy and a caution induced more by inherent Russian characteristics than by a fear of US military response. So it is important that the United States have the conventional military, primarily naval, power to deter Soviet adventures in the Third World.

The dynamics of detente aside, cold war animosities between the superpowers still linger on. These smouldering enmities could be sparked into the flame of war by a military confrontation somewhere in the Third World. The cyclical-sequence escalation process, wherein an action by one side results in a similar, but more intense reaction by the other, could quickly spread outside of the Third World trouble spot—and if this happens we are all in trouble.<sup>9</sup>

This tit-for-tat escalation could occur precisely because the vital interests of the superpowers are not initially called into question—as they would be in Central Europe, for example. Because each superpower would have room to maneuver, the crisis could be prolonged. But if the crisis were to be protracted, then national honor, alliance credibility and the chance for accident or miscalculation would come into play. After the escalation had exhausted all of the possibilities for leverage in the local area, the next step could be to escalate outside of the local area. This scenario is by no means inevitable, but has been made more likely by the convergence of the force projection capabilities of the superpowers.

Overall, the international trends that have been at work since World War II are altering the nature of warfare in ways that could put the United States at a disadvantage by the year 2000. The path of the United States is not irreversible, but major changes will be required in US strategy and force structure to cope with the future strategic environment. Among these changes must be (1) a reorientation of US strategy away from its almost exclusive preoccupation with western Europe; (2) the construction and maintenance of a strong navy; (3) the creation of a strong combat contingency force that can project US power in the Third World to deter Soviet adventurism when it is in the US interest to so do; and (4) the retention of the capability to deter nuclear war and major conventional war.

By emphasizing a strong non-NATO contingency force and a rejuvenated Navy, US strategy will truly become flexible. Obviously, this type of strategy cannot be devised overnight, nor will it be possible to build the force structure necessary to implement it in a short time, but now is the time to think the thoughts and to debate the issues that will establish the needs of the US national security establishment in the 21st century.

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